Rep. Mark Cojuangco briefs media representatives on the status of the power plant

NAPOCOR President Froilan Tampinco, center, answers questions from Bayan Muna Rep. Teddy Casiño and AGHAM Chair Dr. Giovanni Tapang, right

A Napocor engineer gives detailed briefing on the maintenance of the plant

Philippine Climate Watch Alliance
23 January 2009
Press Release

Environmental groups warn against revival of Bataan Nuclear Power Plant

An alliance of progressive sectoral and environmental groups dispute the basis for re-commissioning the mothballed Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) as it imperils the future of our country and is a repeat of the wrongs of the past.

Senate Bill No. 2665, or the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant Re-commissioning Act of 2008, is claimed "to revisit and utilize the nuclear power option" to address global warming and the "shortfall in the electric generating capacity of the country in 2012."

Philippine Climate Watch Alliance (PCWA) spokesperson, Meggie Nolasco expressed that, "We have more than enough sustainable energy resources that can be tapped like hydro, geothermal, wind, solar and natural gas to meet our country's energy requirement and propel us to energy independence. There is not one valid reason for us to resort to nuclear energy."

The group pointed out that the BNPP will not address global warming as its proponents claim.

"That the nuclear power plant will not emit greenhouse gases is a perverse lie. In addition to uranium ore being non-renewable, large amounts of carbon will be emitted due to the fuel that is needed to operate the plant," said Dr. Kelvin Rodolfo, renowned geologists and a member of PCWA.

The re-commissioning will also uselessly spend needed funds for real and meaningful solutions to climate change and energy crisis. The construction and generating costs of nuclear power are far greater than most renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies around the world.

"The most probable reason why the Arroyo government, particularly the Department of Energy, is reviving the nuclear option is that it is a multibillion dollar project where fat and grease money will come in from foreign energy corporations and international financial institutions," stated Clemente Bautista of Kalikasan People's Network for the Environment and member of PCWA.

It was President Aquino who declared in 1986 that BNPP has roughly 4,000 defects and was unsafe to operate. Even though the BNPP has never produced a single watt of electricity, the Filipino people still paid a total of Php120 billion for principal and interest since 1986.

"We just need to recall that President Marcos and his cronies are estimated to have gotten $80 million in kickbacks. With the current administration, that is said to be the most corrupt and with many scams already under her name, the BNPP will just be another racket at the expense of the safety of our people and environment," Bautista remarked.

PCWA stand their ground that BNPP is an un-sound proposal for a country with vast renewable energy potential. Its proponents should be trashed along with the BNPP, which is already widely known to be hazardous to the environment, health of the people, and national security.

Reference: Meggie Nolasco, spokesperson, Philippine Climate Watch Alliance, 09163733275.
--
The Philippine Climate Watch Alliance (PCWA) is a broad network of non-government organizations, grassroots and people's organizations, and individuals aiming to examine and address the impacts of climate change on marginalized communities within the country.

For inquiries, please contact the Secretariat:
Website: www.philclimatewatch.org
Telefax No. +632-9209099,+632-9248756
Email: pcwa.secretariat@gmail.com
 

Bayan Muna Rep. Teddy Casiño and AGHAM Chair. Dr. Giovanni Tapang interviewed by media in Morong, Bataan

Saga of Bataan nuclear plant debt ends next year
By Gil C. Cabacungan Jr.
Inquirer
Last updated 04:16am (Mla time) 11/24/2006

Published on Page A1 of the November 24, 2006 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer

BY THE END of next year, the Philippines shall have unshackled the ball-and-chain debt that has hobbled a generation of Filipinos who have had to pay out P120 billion for principal and interest since 1986 for the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) that has never produced a single spark of electricity.

The Department of Budget and Management and the Bureau of the Treasury confirmed that the $50-million allocation (over P2.5 billion) in the 2007 budget represented the last of the BNPP debt to be paid by the government. (A small part of the BNPP borrowings was converted in 1992 to longer-term low-interest Brady Bonds due in 2017 and 2018).

Westinghouse Electric Co., which made the equipment for the world’s first nuclear power plant in 1957, built the BNPP from 1974 to 1984 for the dictator Ferdinand Marcos at a cost of $2.3 billion or nearly four times the initial bid of $600 million.

The plant was constructed on a 357-hectare government reservation at Napot Point in Morong town, Bataan province, 9 kilometers from Mt. Natib, a slumbering volcano sandwiched between the earthquake-prone Philippine Fault and the West Luzon Fault.

When President Corazon Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she ordered the nuclear plant mothballed, declaring it was shot through with roughly 4,000 defects and was unsafe to operate.

Albay Representative Joey Salceda said: “Why is it that the power sector breeds much of our grand follies in history? You start with Marcos buying one for the price of two. If the 600-megawatt plant was not mothballed, we would have avoided $11 billion in stranded power costs.”

Salceda, an economic adviser to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was referring to the decision of former President Fidel V. Ramos to enter into multibillion-dollar contracts with independent power producers to avert the massive power shortages he inherited from Aquino, who failed to put in place alternative projects for the scrapped BNPP, in the 1990s.

Perverse alternative

Salceda estimated that had the government placed the P37 billion for the BNPP in safer investments in 1986, it would have yielded a total of P420 billion in earnings for the country based on Treasury bill yields compounded over the last 20 years.

“But in a perverse alternative, the P420 billion would have gone to another folly,” Salceda said.

Budget Secretary Rolando Andaya said the BNPP debacle “underscores the importance of due diligence in considering projects that would entail public funding as well as spreading the risks to include the private sector.”

“We shouldn’t trade short-term gains for long-term pain. Big ticket projects should pay for themselves and if they flounder, government should not always bail them out. The risk should be borne by private investors as well. This way we won’t be exposed to contingent debt that would end up as sovereign obligations. We should adopt the user pays principle so we will not backload payments for future generations,” Andaya said.

What might have been

Despite the coming end of the BNPP debt saga, past and present officials and activists continued to ponder the what-might-have-beens had the government opted to repudiate the BNPP debt in 1986 or, alternatively, put the nuclear plant to use one way or another.

Freedom from Debt Coalition president Ana Maria R. Nemenzo said that Aquino was “equally guilty” as Marcos for foisting the “notoriously scandalous debt” on the Filipino people -- “the strongman for building it and his successor for insisting on paying for it.”

 

Nemenzo said that Aquino should have done a generation of Filipinos a favor by repudiating the BNPP debt when she and the Philippines were the toast of the world after the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986.

No guts

“Cory (Aquino) just did not have the guts; she could have opted not to pay this illegitimate debt. Instead, she adopted a policy to honor all debts just to prevent the Philippines from being an international pariah. But look at what it cost us,” said Nemenzo.

To make matters worse, Nemenzo said Aquino and succeeding presidents made it a priority to pay the BNPP and other foreign debt through automatic appropriations in the budget ahead of spending for more pressing needs such as education and social services.

Nemenzo said Aquino probably did not want to earn the ire of Washington by reneging on the Philippines’ commitment to the US Export Import Bank, whose decision to finance the project despite its bloated cost was key to BNPP’s construction.

“The act alone would have fractured relations with the US and showed to the world the US responsibility in coddling Marcos,” Nemenzo said.

Another issue in the BNPP saga was whether the plant should have been used.

Sold as scrap?

Raul T. Concepcion, a businessman and consumer advocate, said that when the government decided to honor the BNPP contract, it should have decided to use the nuclear plant or at least sold it as scrap in 1986 when it still had a higher value.

Concepcion was part of a private mission that brought Korea Electric Power Corp. (Kepco) to the Philippines in 1992 with an offer to turn the BNPP from a “dead asset” into a fully operational power plant.

“It is money wasted down the drain. This is why we see a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. It is our people that have to pay for fiascoes like these in the form of higher taxes, inadequate social services, infrastructure, education and housing,” said Concepcion who has called for a review of the country’s nuclear energy policy in view of sky-high oil prices.

Former senator Rene Saguisag, who headed the presidential commission on the BNPP, had rejected operating the BNPP twice -- in 1986 and 1992 -- because of the public’s fear of a possible nuclear meltdown that was triggered by the Three Mile Island accident in the United States.

Go after Disini

“It was an emotional decision but we stand by it. The public’s opposition against the nuclear plant was strong, the psychological resistance was insuperable. If people who can send men to space can blow up nuclear plants, what more the people who cannot go beyond the jeepney?” said Saguisag.

Instead of regretting what might have been, Saguisag suggested that the government run after the people responsible for the BNPP debt, including businessman Herminio Disini, who used his connections with Marcos to award the nuclear power plant contract to Westinghouse instead of General Electric.

Saguisag noted that Disini, a reputed Marcos bagman who was believed to have received $17 million in bribes in the deal, had yet to face the music more than three decades after “fixing” the contract and with just one year left before the BNPP is fully paid for.
 

Saga of Bataan nuclear plant debt ends next year - INQUIRER.net ...

Major Nuclear Power Plant Accidents
 

December 12, 1952
A partial meltdown of a reactor's uranium core at the Chalk River plant near Ottawa, Canada, resulted after the accidental removal of four control rods. Although millions of gallons of radioactive water poured into the reactor, there were no injuries.
 

October 1957
Fire destroyed the core of a plutonium-producing reactor at Britain's Windscale nuclear complex - since renamed Sellafield - sending clouds of radioactivity into the atmosphere. An official report said the leaked radiation could have caused dozens of cancer deaths in the vicinity of Liverpool.
 

Winter 1957-'58
A serious accident occurred during the winter of 1957-58 near the town of Kyshtym in the Urals. A Russian scientist who first reported the disaster estimated that hundreds died from radiation sickness.
 

December 7, 1975
At the Lubmin nuclear power complex on the Baltic coast in the former East Germany, a short-circuit caused by an electrician's mistake started a fire. Some news reports said there was almost a meltdown of the reactor core.
 

1976
nr. Greifswald, East Germany: radioactive core of reactor in the Lubmin nuclear power plant nearly melted down due to the failure of safety systems during a fire.
 

March 28, 1979: Three-Mile Island
Near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, America's worst nuclear accident occurred. A partial meltdown of one of the reactors forced the evacuation of the residents after radioactive gas escaped into the atmosphere.
 

February 11, 1981
Eight workers are contaminated when more than 100,000 gallons of radioactive coolant fluid leaks into the contaminant building of the Tennessee Valley Authority's Sequoyah 1 plant in Tennessee.
 

April 25, 1981
Officials said around 45 workers were exposed to radioactivity during repairs to a plant at Tsuruga, Japan.
 

April 26, 1986
The world's worst nuclear accident occurred after an explosion and fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. It released radiation over much of Europe. Thirty-one people died iin the immediate aftermath of the explosion. Hundreds of thousands of residents were moved from the area and a similar number are belived to have suffered from the effects of radiation exposure.
 

September 30, 1999
Another accident at the uranium processing plant at Tokaimura, Japan, plant exposed fifty-five workers to radiation. More than 300,000 people living near the plant were ordered to stay indoors. Workers had been mixing uranium with nitric acid to make nuclear fuel, but had used too much uranium and set off the accidental uncontrolled reaction.
2004
 

Aug. 9, Mihama, Japan: nonradioactive steam leaked from a nuclear power plant, killing four workers and severely burning seven others.
2007
 

July 17, Kashiwazaki, Japan: radiation leaks, burst pipes, and fires at a major nuclear power plant followed a 6.8 magnitude earthquake near Niigata. Japanese officials, frustrated at the plant operators' delay in reporting the damage, closed the plant a week later until its safety could be confirmed. Further investigation revealed that the plant had unknowingly been built directly on top of an active seismic fault.
 

Dr. Arcilla of the UP National Institute of Geological Sciences

Dr. Carlito Aleta, former director and current consultant of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute

Download draft bill to reopen BNPP

Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident
 

Background
 

On April 26, 1986, an accident occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former USSR. The accident, caused by a sudden surge of power, destroyed the reactor and released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.
 

To stop the fire and prevent a criticality accident as well as any further substantial release of fission products, boron and sand were poured on the reactor from the air. In addition, the damaged unit was entombed in a temporary concrete "sarcophagus," to limit further release of radioactive material. Control measures to reduce radioactive contamination at and near the plant site included cutting down and burying a pine forest of approximately 1 square mile. The three other units of the four-unit Chernobyl nuclear power station were subsequently restarted. The Soviet nuclear power authorities presented an initial report on the accident at an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting in Vienna, Austria, in August 1986.
 

After the accident, access to the area in a 30-kilometer (18-mile) radius around the plant was closed, except for persons requiring official access to the plant and to the immediate area for evaluating and dealing with the consequences of the accident and operation of the undamaged units. The population evacuated from the most heavily contaminated areas numbered approximately 116,000 in 1986 and another 230,000 people in subsequent years (Source: UNSCEAR 2000, IAEA 2005).
 

Pripyat, the town near Chernobyl where most of the workers at the plant lived before the 1986 accident, was evacuated several days after the accident, because of radiological contamination. It was included in the 30-km Exclusion Zone around the plant and is closed to all but those with authorized access.
Health Effects from the Accident
 

The Chernobyl accident caused many severe radiation effects almost immediately. Among the approximately 600 workers present on the site at the time of the accident, 2 died within hours of the reactor explosion and 134 received high radiation doses and suffered from acute radiation sickness. Of these, twenty eight workers died in the first four months after the accident. Another 200,000 recovery workers involved in the initial cleanup work of 1986-1987 received doses of between 0.01 and 0.50 Gy. The number of workers involved in cleanup activities at Chernobyl rose to 600,000, although only a small fraction of these workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. Both groups of cleanup and recovery workers may become ill because of their radiation exposure, so their health is being monitored.
 

The Chernobyl accident also resulted in widespread contamination in areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine inhabited by millions of residents. Radiation exposure to residents evacuated from areas heavily contaminated by radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident also has been a concern. Average doses to Ukrainian and Belarusian evacuees were 17 mSv and 31 mSv, respectively. Individual exposures ranged from a low of 0.1 to 380 mSv. However, the majority of the five million residents living in contaminated areas received very small radiation doses which are comparable to natural background levels (1 mSv per year).
 

The health of these residents also has been monitored since 1986, and to date there is no strong evidence for radiation-induced increases of leukemia or solid cancer (other than thyroid cancer). An exception is a large number of children and adolescents who in 1986 received substantial radiation doses in the thyroid after drinking milk contaminated with radioactive iodine. To date, about 4,000 thyroid cancer cases have been detected among these children. Although 99% of these children were successfully treated, nine children and adolescents in the three countries died from thyroid cancer. Fortunately, no evidence of any effect on the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes, delivery complications, stillbirths or overall health of children has been observed among the families living in the most contaminated areas.
 

Apart from the increase in thyroid cancer after childhood exposure, no increase in overall cancer or non-cancer diseases have been observed that can be attributed to the Chernobyl accident and exposure to radiation. However, it is estimated that approximately 4,000 radiation-related cancer deaths may eventually be attributed to the Chernobyl accident over the lifetime of the 200,000 emergency workers, 116,000 evacuees, and 270,000 residents living in the most contaminated areas. This estimate is far lower than initial speculations that radiation exposure would claim tens of thousands of lives, but it is not greatly different from estimates made in 1986 by Soviet scientists.
US Reactors and NRC's Response
 

U.S. reactors have different plant designs, broader shutdown margins, robust containment structures, and operational controls to protect them against the combination of lapses that led to the accident at Chernobyl. Although the NRC has always acknowledged the possibility of major accidents, its regulatory requirements provide adequate protection, subject to continuing vigilance, including review of new information that may suggest weaknesses.
 

Assessments in the light of Chernobyl have indicated that the causes of the accident have been adequately dealt within the design of U.S. commercial reactors. However, the Chernobyl accident emphasized the importance of safe design in both concept and implementation, of operational controls, of competence and motivation of plant management and operating staff to operate in strict compliance with controls, and of backup features of defense-in-depth against potential accidents.
 

Although a large nuclear power plant accident somewhere in the United States is unlikely because of design and operational features, the assessment of Chernobyl raised questions as to whether changes were needed to NRC regulations or guidance regarding reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, operator training, and emergency planning.
 

The NRC's response to the Chernobyl accident was divided into three major phases: (1) determining the facts of the accident, (2) assessing the implications of the accident for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, and (3) conducting additional specific studies suggested by the assessment.
 

The first phase, fact finding, was a coordinated effort between several U.S. government agencies and some private groups, with the NRC acting as the coordinating agency. The work was completed in January 1987 and reported in NUREG-1250, "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station."
 

The second phase, the implications study, was reported in NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," issued in April 1989. The report concluded that no immediate changes were needed in the NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors as a result of lessons learned from Chernobyl.
 

For the third phase, Chernobyl follow-up studies for U.S. reactors were reported in June 1992 in NUREG-1422, "Summary of Chernobyl Follow-up Research Activities." That report closed out the Chernobyl follow-up research program, though certain issues will continue to receive attention in the normal course of NRC work. For example, the NRC will follow long-term lessons with regard to contamination control -- decontamination, ingestion pathway, relocation of people. The NRC recognizes that the Chernobyl experience should remain a valuable part of the information to be taken into account when dealing with reactor safety issues in the future.
 

Discussion
 

The Chernobyl reactors are of the RBMK type. These are high-power, pressure-tube reactors, moderated with graphite and cooled with water. At the time of the Chernobyl accident there were 17 RBMKs in operation in the Soviet Union and two in Lithuania. Since the accident, five RBMKs have been shut down. All four units at Chernobyl and one of the Lithuanian RBMKs were shut down.
 

At Chernobyl:
– Unit 4 reactor was destroyed in the 1986 accident;
– Unit 2 was shut down five years later; after a serious turbine building fire;
– Unit 1 was closed in November 1996, and
– Unit 3 was closed December 15, 1999, as promised by Ukrainian President
Leonid Kuchma.
 

In Lithuania, Ignalina Unit 1 was shut down in December 2004 as a condition of admission to the European Union. Of the remaining 12 operating RBMKs, 11 are in Russia and one is in Lithuania (proposed to be decommissioned by 2009).
 

The countries of the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine helped in closing these reactors. This effort included support for such things as Chernobyl Unit 3 plant-specific short-term safety upgrades, decommissioning of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, development of an action plan for addressing the social impacts on workers and their families resulting from Chernobyl closure, and identification of power supply investments needed to meet Ukraine's future electrical power needs.
 

On April 26, 1996, the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, Ukrainian President Kuchma formally established the Chernobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radio-ecology in the town of Slavutych. The Center would provide the Ukraine with an indigenous, institutional capability to provide technical support to its nuclear power industry, the academic community, and nuclear regulators.
 

Sarcophagus
 

Construction of the sarcophagus covering the destroyed Chernobyl Unit 4 was started in May 1986 and completed by the Soviet authorities in an extremely challenging environment six months later in November. It was quickly built as a temporary fix to channel remaining radiation from the reactor through air filters before being released to the environment. After several years, uncertainties about the actual condition of the sarcophagus, primarily due to the high radiation environment, began to emerge.
 

In 1997, the countries of the G-7, the European Commission and Ukraine agreed that a multilateral funding mechanism be established to help Ukraine transform the existing sarcophagus into a stable and environmentally safe system through the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan. The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established to finance the Plan. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was entrusted with managing the Fund. The Plan is intended to protect the personnel, population and environment from the threat of the very large inventory of radioactive material contained within the existing sarcophagus for many decades. First, the existing sarcophagus will be stabilized and then eventually it will be replaced with a new safe shelter (confinement). New shelter construction is expected to start in late 2006 with a design to include an arch-shaped steel structure, which will slide across the existing sarcophagus via rails. This new structure is designed to remain functional for 100 years.
 

Information Resources
 

UNSCEAR 1988 Report, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation
Annex D, Exposures from the Chernobyl accident.
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/1988annexd.pdf
UNSCEAR 1988 Report, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation
Appendix to Annex G, Early effects in man of high radiation doses.
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/1988annexgappx.pdf
UNSCEAR 2000 Report, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Annex J, Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident.
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/annexj.pdf
Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Their Remediation: Twenty years of Experience, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Environment," August 2005
http://www.iaea.org/
Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group on "Health," Geneva 2006
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/who_chernobyl_report_2006.pdf
Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, September 2005.
http://www.iaea.org/
April 2006
 

From:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html